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EDITORIALS
THE LAKE CARGO RATE CASE OF FEBRUARY 1928.-In the
last issue of this quarterly we published a note summarizing the Lake Cargo Rate Case of August 1925.1 Since that
publication another decision in the lake cargo rate controversy has been handed down, 2 in which the voluntary reduction of lake cargo rates on coal offered by the Norfolk
and Western and Chesapeake and Ohio and other southern railroads, was denied. From this last decision the
southern coal operators are appealing. It is, therefore, not
timely to discuss either the constitutionality of this decision
or the legality of the Commission's interpretation. The
economic effect of this decision in West Virginia is disastrous. The decision puts a handicap on West Virginia coal
mines of from forty-five to sixty-three cents a ton, and there
are grounds for believing that this handicap will cut away
a part of the economic foundation on which the industries
of the state rest. Comment, therefore, upon the policy of
34 V. VA. L. QuAR. 202 (1928).
2 Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 127 I. C. C., Docket No. 2967 (Feb. 1928).
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the decision, regardless of its legality, becomes of immedi-

ate public interest.
With the publication of the recent Lake Cargo decision,

a full realization of the enormous power -of the Interstate
Commerce Commission has dawned on the people of West
Virginia. The Commission has gradually acquired or
usurped (depending upon the point of view) power to
make or unmake cities, to favor or ruin great industries,
and holds in its hands the economic salvation or ruin of
millions. The source of that power is vague and difficult to
define exactly. It is found, according to the Commission itself,3 in three sections of the Interstate Commerce Act, sections 1, 3 and 15a. 4 The Lake Cargo decisions turn upon
the necessarily vague words used in these sections, such as
"just and reasonable," "unjust and unreasonable," "undue
or unreasonable advantage," "fair return." The present

interpretation of these sections as it appears in the Lake
Cargo cases has a long history.
History of Lake Cargo Decision. The history of the Lake
Cargo Cases is the history of competition between two great

rival coal fields, one being the Ohio No. 8, Pittsburgh and
Cambridge districts, located in Pennsylvania and eastern

Ohio, the other the West Virginia, Virginia, Kentucky and
Tennessee fields.

The Pittsburgh fields are located closer

to the lake cargo market.
Prior to 1912 railroad companies serving these respec"The power of this Commission to grant relief exists in many forms, as set out
in Sections 1, 3 and 15a of the Act." Commissioner Taylor's concurring opinion, p. 33,
supra, n. 2.
The following quotations from these sections are applicable:
§ 1, subsection 5: "All changes made for any service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or property * * * * shall be just and reasonable, and every unjust and unreasonable charge for such service or any part thereof
is prohibited and declared to be unlawful * * * * ."
§ 3, subsection 1 provides: "That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier
subject to the provisions of this Act to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality,
or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any
particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description
of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."
§ 15a, subsection 2, provides: "In the exercise of its power to prescribe just
and reasonable rates the Commission shall initiate, modify, establish or adjust such
rates, so that carriers as a whole (or as a whole in each of such rate groups or territories as the Commission may from time to time designate) will, under honest, efficient and economic management and reasonable expenditures for maintenance of way,
structures and equipment, earn an aggregate annual net operating income equal, as
nearly as may be, to a fair return upon the aggregate rate of the railway value of such
carriers held for and used in the service of transportation: Provided, That the Commission shall have reasonable latitude to modify or adjust any particular rate which it may
find to be unjust or unreasonable and to prescribe different rates for different sections
of the country."
§ 13, subsection 4 may also have a bearing but is not particularly mentioned
in the Commission's report.
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tive fields were permitted to establish their own rates. In
comparison with the Pennsylvania coal fields it cost nine
cents a ton more to haul coal from the Kanawha and Thacker districts of West Virginia, and twenty-four cents a ton
more to ship from the other coal fields of West Virginia.
The West Virginia fields at that time were contributing
only a small volume of the traffic, which, according to
Commissioner Taylor of the Interstate Commerce Commission, "was not unwholesome or a material interference with
the natural rights of location possessed by- the northern
mines.' 5 By 1912 however, the Pittsburgh operators began
to feel West Virginia competition. They therefore asked,
and succeeded in obtaining from the Interstate Commerce
Commission an increase of the nine cent differential to 19c,
and the twenty-four cent differential to 34c. This was
done by reducing the Pittsburgh rates.6
In 1917, under war conditions, the Interstate Commerce
Commission again increased the differential from the Kanawha and Thacker districts from 19c to 25c, and the differ7
ential from other West Virginia fields from 34c to 40c.
In spite of the fact that after 1917 it -cost from 25c to 40c
a ton more to ship coal from West Virginia fields to the
lake cargo market, the West Virginia and other southern
operators, by improved machinery, good business management, through the absence of difficulties such as strikes and
lock-outs, increased their participation in the lake cargo
market until they dominated the market."
To meet this competition of the southern coal fields, in
1925 the Pittsburgh producers again asked government
aid. They demanded of the Interstate Commerce Commission the establishment of an even higher differential. 9 It
is to be noted that they were not interested in the reasonableness of the rates so much as the relationship of the rates
'P. 31, supra, n. 2.
a Advance in Coal Rates by C. & 0. Ry. Co., 22 I. C. C. 604 (1912) ; Boileau v.
P. & L. E. R. Rt. Co., 22 L C. C. 640 (1912).
7 Lake Cargo Rates, 46 I C. C. 159, 188 (1917).
In this case the court Intimated
that distance and transportation conditions were not as important as commercial con.
ditions and competition between railroads.
."The percentage of the total lake-cargo tonnage shipped from the southern West
Virginia and Kentucky districts has increased from 24 per cent in 1913, 4D per cent in
1921, and 57 p~r cent in 1924, to 71 per cent in 1926 and 74 per cent in the first nine
months of 1927. * * * * The shift in tonnage to the southern districts appears to have

been due, in a large measure, to lockouts, miners' strikes, and to higher costs of pro.
ducing coal in the northern than in the southern districts, and these conditions, although
in constantly lessening degree, still prevail in those districts. Advance Opinion of February 1928, p. 5a.
Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 101 L C. C. 513 (1925).
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to the West Virginia fields. In other words, it wag an attempt
to cut off the competition from the southern districts.10 After
months of consideration, on July 16th, 1925, the majority
of the Commission decided that the existing rates were not
unduly preferential. The opinion was written by CommissIoner Hall and concurred in by Commissioner Esch. A
rehearing was asked and the case re-opened. The term of
Commissioner Cox, who concurred in the opinion, expired;
Commissioner Esch changed his mind. As a result, in February 1927, the former Lake Cargo Case of 1925 was reversed and differentials of 45c, 48c, 60c and 63c a ton were
established in favor of the Pennsylvania districts and
against the various West Virginia districts."
After this decision the southern carriers were faced with
the loss of the lake cargo traffic. To meet this situation
they proposed to reduce their rates to an amount which
would restore the differential in effect ever since 1917. This
proposed reduction was suspended by the Commission by
order of August 16th, 1927, and after further hearing, the
southern carriers were ordered to cancel their proposed
schedules on or before March 27th, 1928.12 From this last
decision the southern carriers appealed to the courts.
It is apparent from the above history that an industrial
war, rather than a discussion of rates, has been in progress.
The principal witness in the 1925 case testified:
"Q. This case then is really a commercial fight by
your districts against West Virginia and Kentucky, and
is not a rate case, is it?
"A. Any rate case I ever heard of was a commercial
fight and this is just like the rest of them."'13
Twice prior to 1925 the West Virginia fields have been put
under a heavier handicap for the purpose of keeping them
from competing with the Pennsylvania fields. Each time
they have succeeded in spite of that handicap in obtaining
more and more of that market, and finally dominating it,
because of better management and better coal. The 1925
case was the third attempt to increase this handicap and
was brought for the purpose not of fixing reasonable rates
"o
4

Ibid., 515.
Su2,ra, n. 2.

21 Order of Interstate Commerce Commission, Docket 2967, Feb. 21, 1928.
11 Quoted from Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 101 L C. C. 513, 541 (1925).
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but of putting the southern fields at a greater disadvantage.14 The last handicap is probably greater than they
can overcome and will remove them from the market. Their
own carriers have tried to aid them with lower rates, but
have been prevented from assisting them in their difficulties
by a suspension of the order lowering those rated? What,
then, are the reasons for this action? Under what theory
or formulae has the Interstate Commerce Commission proceeded?
Theory and Reasons for Lake Cargo Decision. The theories
and formulae adopted by the Commission in reaching their
various decisions in this controversy are difficult to state
for the following reasons. (1) The Commission has reversed itself once in tvo years. (2) The commissioners who
concur in the result do not agree on their reasons. 5 (3)
The decision is based on the interpretation of words which
have no fixed meaning, such as "just and reasonable rates,"
"unjust and unreasonable rates," "undue and unreasonable
advantage to any particular person * * * or locality," "fair
return on Aggregate value."'16 To such words as these any
number of theories or formulae, or even no theory at all,
may be equally applicable. The following however seems
fairly clear:
(1) The majority of the Commission claim that they are
not concerned with what the witness above quoted 17 says
is the crux of the controversy, i.e., the competition between the
districts. Interests of mine owners, or of the localities where
the mines are situate, is of concern only incidentally. The
Commission with a steady eye looks beyond, through, over,
or under these matters to what appears to them to be the
real issue, the prosperity, reasonableness, and general uniformity of the transportation system. Railroads, and railroads only, are what they are concerned with. For example,
"Clearly it is not within our power to adjust rates for
the primary purpose of enabling competing shippers to
1 "Complainants
(the northern operators) make a determined attack upon the
reasonableness of the rates from the Pittsburgh, Ohio and Cambridge districts, but confea that it would avail them little If anything for us to sustain their contention in full
and reduce their rates if we do not also prevent corresponding reductions in rates from
the districts alleged to be preferred." 101 I. C. C. 518, 541 (1925).
11 Commissioners Eastman and Taylor concur in the result but on theories differing
not only from the majority report, but with each other. They file Separate concurring
opinions in the 1927 report and also in the 1928 report.
' See provisions of Interstate Commerce Act set out in n. 4, supra.
17 See n. 18, supra.
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market their products. The rates which we find in proceedings before us to be lawful may have that effect, but
fundamentally they must be. based upon c6nditions surrounding the transportation, including the cost and value
of the service. 18
"These commercial and economic conditions are alleged to create a public interest in these proposed rates
which in itself is said to be sufficient foi their justification * * * * *. Obviously however the public interest can
not prevail if the proposed rates would violate any of
the provisions of the interstate commerce act which we
administer. 19
"When the standards are applied the necessary and
immediate effect may be to interject into an existing commercial situation new factors important to those who produce or distribute, buy or sell and to their competitors,
but such a result is neither the cause nor end which has
motivated our action."2
These statements are difficult to reconcile with the facts
of the situation. The Pittsburgh producers who brought
the complaint are not seeking to improve the uniformity and
prosperity of railroad systems. And how, with these statements in mind, can the commission logically give substantial weight in their opinion to the Hoch-Smith Resolution
which seeks to have rates made ifor the sole purpose of aiding farmers? 21 In considering the Hoch-Smith Resolution is
not the Commission violating these very canons which they
say they start out with? And finally, can an intelligent or
useful decision be made on a bitterly controverted question
when the most important element in the whole controversy
is ignored? We will not pause to argue this because we
are seeking the theory of the decision and that foundation
seems to be that public interest, changes in economic situation,
caused by the rates, and similar matters will not be primarily considered. 22 The Commission appears to believe that
it is possible to separate the interest of the railroads from
2 Advance Opinion of February 1928, p. 5a.
11 Ibid., p. 5b.
10 Ibid., p. 20.
21 "To accord a carrier the right to transport a substantial portion of its tonnage
at rates upon the obviously low level here proposed, while giving no relief to the
agricultural industry, including livestock, which Congress has declared to be in a depressed condition and entitled to the lowest possible lawful rates consistent with the
maintenance of an adequate transportation system, is contrary to that mandate."

Advance Opinion of February 1928, p.

23.

5a In other cases these interests have been more than incidental.
Cf. Andy's Ridge
Coal Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 118 I. C. C. 405 (1927), where the Commission said, "In
determining the differentials we must consider the interest of the consumer as well as
the producer. Rates should be so adjusted as to permit the widest possible competition."
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the communities which they serve. Having made that separation, they claim to be concerned only with railroads.
(2) Since economic conditions of competing districts are,
by express declaration of the Commission, eliminated, the
positive side of the theory under which the Commission acts
may, we believe, be stated as follows:
(a) A railroad will not be permitted to develop additional traffic at rates making a minimum contribution above
"out of pocket" expenses even where such rates are necessary to retain the business, and even where no rate war is
impending, if those rates do not fit in to a vague scheme of
related rates called a rate structure, which exists in the
mind of the Commission.
(b) The details of this rate structure may be changed by
the Commission from time to time without notice to the
economic interests of the localities involved, or without
the interests of the localities involved being considered other
than incidentally.
While the grounds given by the Commissioners in support of the lake cargo decision vary, nevertheless it seems
clear that the above is what they have in mind, i.e., some
vague and complicated structure of rates which is determined upon factors of (1) quantity (or volume of traffic),
(2) quality (or considerations relating to care and expedition of traffic), and (3) relativity between localities and
between commodities. (Relativity between localities contains the idea that no district shall be deprived of its geographical advantages. Relativity between commodities is a
matter of freight classification, figured so that one commodity should not bear more than its share.) These vague
factors are given varying weights, according to circumstances and are set up as the abstract ideals which the
Commission is trying to follow in arriving at a harmonious,
logical and uniform rate structure. This rate structure appears to be the primarily important thing. Other interests
affected are only incidental.2
If we assume that this ideal rate structure toward which
the Commission is striving is a worthy object per se, then

MSupira,

n. 18, 19 and 20.

"To the extent that managerial discretion on the part

of a prosperous carrier may have the effect of lowering rates below the general level,
it runs counter to the expressed policy of Congress as to uniformity and nullifles the
intent to imprehs a trust upon any excessive returns for important National purposes."
Advance Opinion of February 1928, p. 23.
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we are forced to admit that the proposed rates, while profitable in the sense that they exceed out of pocket costs,
nevertheless, may not be uniform with other rates charged
Is a
But what of it?
by the southern carriers.
uniform rate structure either a possible or a desirable
thing? Should it be imposed as a primary object with the
interests of the public, the producer, and the consumer only
incidentall? It is true that there are cases where the Commission is forced to interfere but can it be said that this is
one of them? Our statement that the Commission has ignored actualities in favor of an academic ideal rate structure which is of doubtful utility may be criticized. However, we believe that the following distinctions between this
and other cases where the Commission might act with practical advantage indicate that that statement is correct.
(1) Proposed rates are compensatory. This is not a case
where the southern carriers are offering rates which are
not compensatory. It is admitted that the rates proposed
will increase the net profits of the southern carriers. As
has been said by Mr. Vanderblue, joint author of "Railroads Rate Service Management," "it is good business to
take traffic at rates making a minimum contribution above
out -of pocket expenses rather than to lose the traffic to a
competitor, whether the latter be a rail route or a water
route, or a rail and water line. 12 4 This is not denied by the
Commission.
(2) No rate war is imminent. This is not a case where
the Commission is acting to avoid a rate war which will
have a tendency to disturb the financial balance of transbetween the southern and
portation system. No rate war
25
imminent.
is
carriers
northern
(3) Action not necessary to protect weak railroads. This
is not a case where the Commission is protecting weak carriers which otherwise would not earn a fair return on their
investment. It is true that the Commission has in mind the
26
ultimate profits and prosperity of the northern carriers
but no claim is made that the northern carriers would be
unable at present to earn a fair return on their systems
2' Quoted from "The Long and Short Haul Clause Since 1910" by Homer Vander-

blue, 36 HARV. L. REv. 429.
11 "This might be the opening gun of a rate war, and if such a war transpired we
would have ample ground under the law for interfering. But in my judgment there are
not ypt plain enough indications of such development to warrant condemnation of the
suspended rates on that ground." Advance Opinion of February 1928, p. 26. Commissioner Eastman's concurring opinion.
20 Advance Opinion of February 1928, p. 21.
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without the protection of the Commission in this case.
(4) Rates do not threaten to divert an already established
traffic. It is not a case where a carrier by a proposed rate
threatens to divert an established traffic from a competing
railroad which is now carrying it. Rather it is the opposite, where the Commission by its ruling diverts an established traffic from a carrier which has acquired it to another carrier which desires it. Indeed, it id a case where
-traffic which has been built up in reliance upon former
rulings of the Commission is being violently disturbed without warning.
(5) Proposed rates do not nullify geographical location.
This is not a case where proposed rates will nullify the advantage of geographical location. The proposed rates do
actually give the northern carriers a distinct advantage because of their location. The claim of the Commission is
-that not enough advantage is given by the proposed rates
-to geographical location. The test is whether the more distant locality is actually able to compete. Evidence of successful competition may be even admitted to show that not
sufficient advantage has been given.27
(6) Not a cage of rate discriminationbetween shippers on
one railroad. This is not a case where a single carrier or carriers are discriminating between localities or commodities
on their lines. The carriers involved in this case serve different localities. 28 Shippers of other commodities on southern lines are not complaining because lake cargo rates are
relatively low. Nor will they be benefitted by this decision.
(7) Not a case of unfair division of rates. This is not a
case where the lower rate proposed by the southern carriers will necessarily result in an unfair division of rates
between them and northern participating carriers. It is
-true that a certain proportion of the lake cargo coal from
7

"The record in this case, as in the previous eases which dealt with these lake

cargo rates, is replete with testimony in respect of the mining conditions In the
northern and southern districts and the ability or Inability of the producers to market
their coal under the rates in effect or proposed. * * *
In the original cases which
concerned these lake-cargq rates evidence with respect to the movement of coal under
the rates in issue was admissible for the purpose of showing that the complaining parties had been injured by prejudice alleged by them in the rate adjustment, and to
enable us to appraise at true weight the rate comparisons before us. * * * Except in
its relation to these particular points we have no concern with this evidence, and for
any other purpose we shall give it no consideration." Advance Opinion of February
19286 p. Ba.
"What Congress sought to prevent by that section (referring to § 8) as originally
enacted was in differences between localities in transportation rates, facilities and
privileges by unjust discrimination against them by the same carrier or carriers." Central R. R. Co. of N. J. v. U. S., 257 U. S. 247, 260 (1921).
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southern fields is carried through Ohio by northern car9 At least one of the concurring
riers, but not all of it.2
commissioners does not consider this of sufficient importance
on which to base the decision. 80
With these distinctions in mind, it appears that the effect of what the Commission has done is to set up an ideal
standard of a uniform rate stricture. Rates must not only
be reasonable per ge, but they must be relatively reasonable in
conformance to that structure. To maintain that vague
structure the commission does not hesitate to fetter railroad competition, to ignore present economic conditions in
favor of what they term ultimate desired results, to prevent
any assured reliance upon present existing rates and to put
whole sections of the country in danger of a sudden shift
of all their economic resources.
Whether such a power has actually been granted by the
act under the sections which we have set out in this article,
or whether such a power, if granted, is constitutional, it
would be improper for us to discuss at this time, in view of
the pending case in court. It might be said that the Interstate Commerce Act can conceivably bear the construction
put upon it by the Commission, 31 yet the policy of such legislation, if this be a proper interpretation of it, is always
open to discussion. We believe it can fairly be said that if
the Commission were given the power to prevent rate wars,
to prevent railroads from charging non-compensatory rates,
to prevent railroads from discriminating between shippers
on its lines, etc., to protect financially weak railroads, such
a power would take care of every conceivable economic
purpose for which the act was passed. The power to set
up and to compel carriers to conform to some ideally conceived uniform rate structure is one which has no definite
boundaries and no limits. If this be a correct interpretation
of the act the Commission will be supreme, because the Su"5 The B. & 0., New York Central and Pennsylvania railroads participate in considerable percentage of the lake cargo haul. This however does not amount to half of
the coal hauled. The Commission makes its ruling however, apply equally to coal
hauled over these participating carriers and coal hauled entirely over the carriers who
propose the rates. Advance Opinion of February 1928, pp. 5 and 6.
s Commissioner Taylor who concurs with the majority says, with respect to basing
a decision on the fact that protesting carriers td some extent participate in the haul,
"It seems unjust and unreasonable that the fundamental rights of the northern field,
shall depend upon the determination of such inconsequential questions as these. To
do so would be like attempting to stand a pyramid on its point."
n An able argument against the conclusions here arrived at is supplied by Henry
Wolf Bikle of the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 36 HARv. L. REv. 5, 25,
where the author says: "A rate may be unduly low if,considering the relative service
of two carriers it tends to an unfair diversion of traffic."
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preme Court does not review the reasons of the Commission
in determining whether a rate is discriminatory, provided
there is no illegality in their action.8 2 To lodge such a
power in the hands of a commission has the following overwhelming objections:
(1) The results are unpredictable. In the present case
the Commission has reversed itself once on practically the
same data. A number of vague and indeterminate factors
are balanced in making the rate structure. No human being can tell to which will be given the most weight.
(2) The managerial discretion of railroads will be limited to the operating department. They have no discretion
within which they can seek to develop new traffic, if that
traffic has a possibility of competing with other sections of
the country.
(3) Cities and states are dependent upon the reactions
of a group of men who are politically appointed and who
are required to follow no rule which can be reduced to any
more definite test than the familiar reasonable man test in
negligence cases. Vast industries are staked upon a jury
verdict given by a jury of experts to be sure,-but nevertheless a jury verdict.
(4) Such a policy has and will create a bitter and continuing fight as to the appointment of members of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In self-protection views of
newly appointed commissioners must be determined in advance before they are confirmed by senators from districts
affected. Such a power will strip the Commission of all
the attributes of a judicial body and transform it into a
bureau exercising a vast and unnecessary power.
For years the Interstate Commerce Commission has been
regarded as a judicial body, the equal of the courts in general esteem, their decisions being accepted as based on law
and fact alone. The power exercised in the Lake Cargo
Case has suddenly made them parties to an industrial war.
Appointments to the Commission are now being determined
by local motives. We submit that no body can assume such
powers of economic salvation or ruin over vast sections of
the country and remain a judicial body, in any real sense of
the word.
-T. W. ARNOLD.
32 Virginia Ry. Co. v. U. S., 272 U. S. 658 (1926).
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